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Academic research on private equity (PE) has been concerned with the management of
PE funds, the returns to investors from investments in PE relative to the returns available
in public equity markets and, more predominantly, the analysis of the post-investment
performance of PE portfolio firms. There has been less research on how PE firms select
their investments and the characteristics of their targeted firms. We derive hypotheses,
from an agency perspective, on the firm-level characteristics of PE-targeted firms. Uti-
lizing data on the population of private companies in the UK, we identify those firms that
have received PE investment from the pool of potential investees within the population of
private companies and known buyouts, and examine their pre-investment characteristics.
Using panel logit regression, we estimate multivariate models determining the probability
of PE acquisition and examine the multivariate profiles of targeted firms in relation to
our hypotheses on PE selection.
Introduction
Private equity (PE) has been a major player in
the provision of growth finance for restructuring
in the UK over a long period (Toms, Wilson and
Wright, 2015; Wright et al., 2000a). PE investment
and later-stage venture capital play an important
role in enhancing performance, stimulating and
sustaining the growth and employment creation
of their targeted companies (Gilligan and Wright,
2014). PE investors typically invest in mature
companies (growth finance) or acquire established
companies (buyouts) to implement value-creation
strategies that realize efficiency improvements
and exploit entrepreneurial growth opportunities.
PE investors may provide growth finance in ex-
change for a minority stake in the company, whilst
buyouts involve a change in company ownership
through the PE investor taking a majority stake
and managerial control. In the UK, the vast ma-
jority of PE investments involve the acquisition of
We would like to acknowledge Professor Mike Wright’s
contribution to this research.
private companies via buyout mechanisms. Buy-
outs by PE firms have attracted much attention
among researchers and policymakers (Block et al.,
2019; Castellaneta and Gottschalg, 2016; Kaul,
Nary and Singh, 2018). However, existing research
has paid little attention to the characteristics of
the targets that PE firms pursue, within the pool
of potential targets, and has instead focused pre-
dominantly on the post-investment performance
consequences of PE-backed buyouts (Kaul, Nary
and Singh, 2018).
In terms of PE-targeted companies, there are
both demand and supply factors. On the supply
side of potential investees, opportunities arise from
the divestment of the subsidiaries of larger en-
terprises; the exit of current owners of owner-
managed or family businesses; and from compa-
nies in financial distress. From examination of data
on all PE-backed buyout deals in the UK, we have
a broad profile of the characteristics of the ‘sup-
ply pool’ (i.e. the range of company types, owner-
ship structures, size, age and sectors) that have his-
torically attracted PE investments throughout the
period under study. These characteristics can be
used to screen the population of private companies
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for all the potential investees that PE investors are
likely to select from. On the demand side, PE in-
vestors seek targets that have potential for perfor-
mance improvement.We focus on the demand side,
that is, the characteristics that PE investors choose
to invest in from the wide pool of potential in-
vestees in the private company population.
In this paper, we aim to identify, empirically,
the distinct characteristics of PE-backed firms and
specifically, identify the characteristics of the tar-
geted firms in the UK within the population of
companies that fit this broad profile of potential
investees. Using multivariate logistic panel regres-
sion on the pool of UK companies from 1995 to
2013, we find that PE funds target established com-
panies in terms of age and size, and companies
which are more likely to have a higher proportion
of tangible assets. The targeted companies are in
stable industry sectors with a lower-than-average
failure rate and are less likely to be diversified (sin-
gle product). Amongst the riskier sectors, PE in-
vestors have a preference for advanced manufac-
turing technologies and the high-technology end
of the services sector. The firms that PE investors
target are generally cash generative, profitable and
have high interest coverage ratios on existing debt.
The targeted firms are likely to have raised finance
by borrowing, as evidenced by charges on assets.
These firms have lower levels of equity and lower-
than-average productivity, thus providing oppor-
tunities for investors to realize performance im-
provement, and growth, post-investment.
The existing evidence suggests an ‘en-
trepreneurial role’ for buyouts (Berg and
Gottschalg, 2005; Wright et al., 2000b). We
therefore contribute to the entrepreneurial finance
literature in several ways. First, our research ad-
vances the existing understanding of PE buyouts
(e.g. Block et al., 2019; Gompers, Kaplan and
Mukharlyamov, 2016; Kaul, Nary and Singh,
2018) by identifying the ‘pre-investment’ char-
acteristics of companies that PE investors deem
investable in the UK. This is particularly impor-
tant given the recognized gap in the literature,
as little is known about the investment criteria
of PE firms (Block et al., 2019; Kaul, Nary and
Singh, 2018). Second, we believe, it is the first
study that empirically analyses the firm-specific
characteristics of the PE-targeted firms using data
up to a 3-year period before the company received
the funding. It therefore adds to the limited liter-
ature on PE investor preferences in portfolio firm
selection. In this study, multivariate models are
estimated that explain the probability that a com-
pany will obtain PE funding using a wide range of
firms’ characteristics. Third, our last contribution
relates to our unique database, which allows us to
contribute to the field by investigating the entire
corporate population of the private companies in
the UK that can potentially become targets of the
PE firms and profiling the target selection within
this subpopulation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
The next section provides a background to the PE
literature in the context of equity finance provi-
sion. The third section develops hypotheses related
to target company selection. The fourth section
presents the research design, including data, sam-
ple, methodology and descriptive statistics. The
fifth section presents the results and the sixth sec-
tion concludes.
Private equity portfolio companies:
Background and literature
A number of academic studies in the UK and
elsewhere have analysed the types of companies
that attract PE investment and the outcomes of
PE investment and governance, post-investment
(see Gilligan and Wright, 2014). PE investors are
specialized and sophisticated investors that under-
take extensive and costly selection and screening
processes of the investment strengths and risks in
order to identify the ‘right’ targets with specific
characteristics (Dawson, 2011; Gompers, Kaplan
andMukharlyamov, 2016; Kaplan and Stromberg,
2004) from within the corporate population.
Existing studies have focused on the post-
investment period and provide mixed findings on
the effect of PE investment on targeted firms
(Cumming, Peter and Tarsalewska, 2020). Sev-
eral studies suggest that PE investors add value
to the targeted companies by improving op-
erating performance (Cohn, Mills and Towery,
2014; Cumming, Siegel and Wright, 2007; Ka-
plan and Stromberg, 2009), increasing productiv-
ity (Davis et al., 2014; Harris, Siegel and Wright,
2005), increasing innovation (Rubera and Tel-
lis, 2014) and improving monitoring and incen-
tives (Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011). Bernstein,
Lerner and Mezzanottie (2019) and Kaplan and
Strömberg (2009) show that PE-backed firms ex-
hibit post-investment performance improvement
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and are more resilient through recession, in line
with Wilson et al. (2012). However, there exist a
number of studies that have cast doubt on the im-
provements of performance, productivity and in-
novation after PE investment (see e.g. Ayash and
Schütt, 2016; Bharath, Dittmar and Sivadasan,
2014; Cumming, Peter and Tarsalewska, 2020).
Regardless of what the real outcome of buyout
transactions are, little is known about the invest-
ment criteria used by PE firms in order to select
their buyout targets (Block et al., 2019; Kaul, Nary
and Singh, 2018). There are limited papers that
provide empirical evidence on PE investment cri-
teria. These studies focus on surveying PE firms
and asking their fund managers about their invest-
ing practices. For example, Gompers, Kaplan and
Mukharlyamov (2016) survey 79 PE investors and
find that PE investors choose their targets by rely-
ing on projected internal rates of return and mul-
tiples of invested capital rather than discounted
cash flow (DCF) or net present value (NPV) tech-
niques. They suggest that this could be due to
practical deficiency in using DCF and/or NPV
in a PE setting in which the investment horizon
is limited and there is considerable information
asymmetry between general and limited partners.
Moreover, Block et al. (2019) conduct an ex-
perimental analysis by screening 19,474 decisions
made by 749 PE investors, where participants of
the study were required to evaluate several hypo-
thetical portfolio companies and decide in which
companies they were more likely to invest. They
find that themost important investment criteria for
PE investors are potential revenue growth, value
added of product/service, the management team’s
track record and profitability. Furthermore, Kaul,
Nary and Singh (2018) study the buyouts of busi-
nesses divested from larger firms using a sample of
1,711 divestments by publicly listed US manufac-
turing sector companies. They find that PE firms
aremore likely to acquire noncore businesses, busi-
nesses whose rivals spendmore onR&D than their
parents and businesses whose parents offer weak
long-term incentives to their top executives.
Tykvova and Borell (2012), in a comprehensive
study of European-based firms, suggest that the
syndication pattern and investor experience de-
termine the choice of buyout targets. They argue
that syndicates are ‘better able to manage high
risks arising from investments in highly financially
constrained companies than stand-alone investors’
(p. 5). This is because syndicates of investors are
better informed (have wider networks) and have
a synergistic combination of skills to bring to the
target firm. This leads to better target selection, ef-
fective monitoring of the investee and high-quality
support for the company during the investment
stages. All these factors, they suggest, reduce the
risk of distress and bankruptcy.
Given the above discussions, it is apparent that
there exists very limited evidence on the character-
istics of targeted firms actually chosen by PE in-
vestors. In this study we try to fill this gap by care-
fully investigating the detailed firm-level character-
istics of the PE-invested firms pre-investment from
the pool of limited companies in the UK.
Private equity targets: Agency
perspective and the development of
hypotheses
The agency theory perspective has been applied
usefully to explain how the PE firm’s active role
as an investor (owner) drives performance changes
in their acquired firms (buyouts). The PE firm is
seen as a principal in its governance relationship
with the investee (Acharya et al., 2013; Kaplan and
Schoar, 2005; Manigart and Wright, 2013). The
PE firm acts on behalf of shareholders to disci-
pline (through leverage) and incentivize (through
targets and share ownership) the buyouts’manage-
ment team (agents). This theoretical lens can be ex-
tended to help us understand the PE firm’s selec-
tion of target companies. Specifically, Meuleman
et al. (2020) suggest that PE firms have a role as
agent to their limited partners and to the banks
that provide debt financing. PE therefore has a
‘dual identity’ (Arcot et al., 2015; Pratt and Fore-
man, 2000), acting both as principal and agent in
a buyout transaction. We argue that this dual role
should influence both the criteria and the bench-
marks used in the PE firms’ non-random selection
of target firms.
The PE model involves a PE firm raising capi-
tal from limited partners such as private individ-
uals and a number of institutional investors to
invest, on behalf of the providers, in a portfo-
lio of target buyouts of privately owned compa-
nies. The goal is to create value for investors on
exit. The PE firms do not have permanent funds,
each investment fund has a predicted lifetime and
therefore PEs have to raise and invest new funds
periodically. Generally, every 4 or 5 years the PE
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firm will go back out into the fundraising market
and raise new capital to invest (Metrick and Ya-
suda, 2010; Sahlman, 1990). PE firms are often ac-
tive in raising new funds from their investors before
the investment period of existing investment funds
has expired (Meuleman et al., 2020). Potential in-
vestors (principals) will scrutinize the performance
of existing PE investments and the cash returned
to investors when making their decision to provide
follow-on funds (Cumming and Walz, 2010). Ob-
viously, the PE firm needs to demonstrate a suc-
cessful track record in order to build reputation
with investors and be successful in raising follow-
on funds (Chung et al., 2012; Kaplan and Schoar,
2005; Kuckertz et al., 2015).
The PE firms negotiate constantly with banks
to raise debt finance for their acquisitions and
essentially act as an agent for the banks (Meule-
man et al., 2020), with whom they often have long-
standing relationships. Banks that provide loan fi-
nance will monitor incidences of loan default and
financial distress amongst the portfolio of PE in-
vestments in their relationship with the PE firm
(Citron, Robbie and Wright, 1997; Fang, Ivashina
and Lerner, 2013). Establishing reputation and
track record is important in reducing information
asymmetries for prospective investors (Balboa and
Marti, 2007). The PE firm’s relationship, as an
agent, with limited partner (LP) investors and debt
financiers is therefore crucial for its own survival
and growth. Consequently, in selecting target com-
panies for each of the invested funds, the PE firms
will balance the needs of the LP investors and the
bank’s lending criteria within each stakeholder’s
time horizon. The PE firm plays an important role
in reducing potential agency problems between eq-
uity and debt investors (Meuleman et al., 2020).
The time horizons of stakeholders place some
pressure on the PE firm to find and select target
companies that meet certain criteria with a view
to creating exit returns (Ahlers et al., 2016). The
providers of the PE funds (principals) expect to see
the monies invested within a certain time period
and are seeking a return within an agreed period
as the PE investors exit (Vanacker et al., 2020).
Having raised funds, the PE investor has a lim-
ited time to create the portfolio of investments in
the selected target firm(s) and therefore to iden-
tify, evaluate, screen and undertake due diligence
processes on potential investment opportunities
(Dimov and Gedajlovic, 2010). Regarding timing,
PE firms deploy the raised capital in the first 3 to
5 years (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Metrick and
Yasuda, 2010). Typically, ‘the (PE) funds are usu-
ally at least 10 year commitments’, but it could
be shorter or take longer depending on the strate-
gic and economic circumstances (Gilligan, 2019, p.
32.). The lifespan of the PE fund is typically 10–12
years (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Meuleman et al.,
2020).
Altogether, PE firms are often believed to be
transitory organizations and hence they aim to
ensure they can service their debt obligations
in a timely fashion (Kaplan, 1991; Rappaport,
1990) and offer the required return to their fund
providers (Vanacker et al., 2020). In this regard,
PE firms try to reduce potential agency problems
between equity and debt investors by balancing
the needs of the LP investors and the bank’s lend-
ing criteria within each stakeholder’s time horizon
(Meuleman et al., 2020). In what follows we ar-
gue that PEfirms deliberately target portfolio firms
with a specific financial and performance back-
ground.
Private equity choice of targets: Hypotheses
PE investors’ experience gives them superior se-
lection and value-adding abilities through better
monitoring and encouragement of entrepreneurial
activities compared to other private investors
(Acharya et al., 2013; Amess, Stiebale andWright,
2015; Bruining, Wervaal and Wright, 2013; Cum-
ming and Zambelli, 2012; Tykvova and Borell,
2012). PE investors seek targets in sectors (Cressy,
Malipiero and Munari, 2007) and with finan-
cial characteristics (Wilson and Wright, 2013)
that have potential for performance improvement
(Dawson, 2011) and, as discussed before, are able
to service the debt and equity structures associated
with such investment. Therefore, in our first hy-
pothesis we aim to empirically test whether firms
with specific historical or recent performance are
better targets for PE investors. We conjecture that
in order to generate an upside, the PE firm will
target buyout acquisitions that are underperform-
ing relative to their peers within their industry sec-
tor and size bands. However, although underper-
forming (relatively), the target firm will have the
potential to generate cash and profit and show
some historical stability in these metrics. Firms
that are profitable and cash-generative may lack
incentive, particularly in markets where competi-
tion is not intense, to control costs and innovate
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in processes and products (i.e. have x-inefficiencies;
Leibenstein, 1966). Thus, we further propose that,
in appraising the target firms, the PE firm will
look to understand the contributory factors un-
derlying the relative underperformance. This may
be related to operational issues arising from poor
or low-calibre management (Balgobin and Pan-
dit, 2001; Bruining, 2019), such as poor cash-flow
management, poor stock control, poor customer
service and failure to exploit new markets or due
to longer-term structural problems and produc-
tion inefficiencies (Campello, 2003; Gimeno et al.,
1997) arising from a lack of capital investment,
cost control or failure to embrace new technol-
ogy. Examples include family firms that have suc-
cession (management) problems and/or have been
reluctant to raise equity finance for needed capi-
tal investment; subsidiaries that no longer fit with
the parent company’s strategy and have been ne-
glected in terms of new investment and process
change (under-investment). Such firms have long-
term survival and low failure risk (Bertrand and
Schoar, 2006; Bradley et al., 2011) but can un-
derperform relative to industry benchmarks. We
therefore propose that the PE firmwill, after acqui-
sition, be able to implement a strategy of process
improvement, management change and capital in-
vestment to generate growth and returns for the LP
investors. Therefore, H1 is as follows:
H1: Private equity targets are more likely to have
a record of profit and cash generation but
are underperforming relative to peer bench-
marks.
As discussed earlier, the PE buyout activities are
usually financed with additional bank debt (see
e.g. Fang, Ivashina and Lerner, 2013; Ivashina and
Kovner, 2011; Meuleman et al., 2020). Leverage or
debt is a PE strategy (as principal) used to disci-
pline or incentivize the target firm’s management
team but as an agent for the bank, the PE firm
will seek targets that have sufficient interest cov-
erage to service this debt. This is because, if a
bank makes significant losses as a result of invest-
ing in a distressed buyout, it will then be unwill-
ing to provide future debt finance to the associ-
ated PE firm (Hotchkiss, Strömberg and Smith,
2014). The bank will appraise the creditworthiness
of the acquisition target and may seek collateral
and/or covenants on the loans (Citron, Robbie and
Wright, 1997; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Fang,
Ivashina and Lerner, 2013; Wright, Gilligan and
Amess, 2009). Indeed, PE firms, as active investors,
will negotiate loan deals on behalf of many of
their portfolio firms, have a closer relationshipwith
the providing banks and perhaps more bargain-
ing power to secure finance than an individual firm
seeking a loan would have (Ivashina and Kovner,
2011). Nonetheless, we conjecture that the PE firm
will seek targets that have a strong base of (tangi-
ble) assets and stability in cash flow, reducing de-
fault and ensuring provision of future loans on
favourable terms. We further expect that targeted
firms are more likely to be in stable industry sec-
tors with relatively uncomplicated asset bases and
product lines, such that risk assessment is relatively
straightforward for the providing bank. As cash
flow stability is a necessity tomeet regular monthly
interest payments (Larkin, 2013), and given PE
firms’ role as agent to reduce the target’s default
risk, we hypothesize that PE investors are more
likely to invest in companies that have assets (col-
lateral) for raising debt and the ability to generate
cash and profit to cover interest payments. Given
that banks desire to identify the existence of suffi-
cient value in the target’s assets to provide security
for the debt finance (Wright and Robbie, 1998), we
argue that PE investors select targets that are less
likely to enter distress and end up in bankruptcy
(i.e. have a low downside and therefore are attrac-
tive for debt providers). H2 is as follows:
H2: Private equity targets are more likely to have a
low failure risk, strong base of tangible assets
(collateral) and exhibit stability in the ability
to generate cash.
A number of studies point to the positive im-
pact of specialized and experienced PE investors in
turning around the performance of buyout targets
(Acharya et al., 2013;Meuleman et al., 2020). This
positive impact necessitates close monitoring and
active involvement in the acquired company’s op-
erations through regular visits and/or board-level
participation. However, as discussed earlier, the ex-
isting evidence provides conflicting results on the
effect of the PE buyouts on productivity improve-
ment of the target firms (Cumming, Peter and
Tarsalewska, 2020). Several studies argue that tar-
get firms’productivity improves as a result of mon-
itoring by PE investors and discipline imposed by
debt providers (Ahlers et al., 2017; Amess, Stiebale
and Wright, 2015; Davis et al., 2014), whereas
several others find that PE targets are associated
with lower post-investment productivity (Ayash
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and Schütt, 2016; Goergen, O’Sullivan andWood,
2014; Weir, Jones and Wright, 2015). Given the
mixed findings on productivity improvement of
the target firms, we investigate whether PE firms
have specific preferences over choosing target firms
with a relatively lower or higher-than-average pro-
ductivity in their sector size range. Building on
the arguments suggested by Kaplan (1991), as ex-
plained earlier, about the short-term vision of PE
firms when it comes to investments and given the
nature of PE funds to ‘buy–improve–sell’ the firms
they acquire (Ayash and Rastad, 2017), we ar-
gue that PE investors are under short-term per-
formance pressure and hence choose targets with
lower-than-average productivity, where an increase
in productivity can be achieved post-investment
via capital expenditure on process and products.
The targeted firms may be in sectors that lack the
competitive pressures that generate efficiency and
innovation. We therefore hypothesize that target
firms are likely to have lower-than-average produc-
tivity, thus providing opportunities for investors
to realize performance improvement, and growth,
post-investment.
H3: Private equity targets are more likely to have
lower-than-average productivity, thus provid-
ing opportunities for investors to realize per-
formance improvement.
In investing specific funds, the PE firm is seek-
ing to establish a portfolio of acquisitions and, as
an active investor, has a close involvement in both
strategy development and implementation, and
the day-to-day monitoring of management (see
e.g. Bruining and Wright, 2002; Bruining, Bon-
net and Wright, 2004; Wiersema and Liebeskind,
1995; Wright, Gilligan and Amess, 2009). In order
to minimize portfolio risk and costs, the PE firm
will seek to establish synergies between portfolio
investments (Klier, Welge and Harrigan, 2009). In
other words, PE firms develop specialisms in rela-
tion to industry sectors and/or firm types or lifecy-
cle stages, and therefore familiarity motivates the
choice of targets (see Sinyard, Dionne and Loch,
2020).
The investment appraisal process and due dili-
gence undertaken prior to investment can be time-
consuming and costly. In line with the previous
hypotheses, we suggest that PE firms will tar-
get companies with defined markets and uncom-
plicated services and/or product lines, where ap-
praisal and opportunity of improvement are clear,
as is the valuation of assets and the identification
of collateral. We argue that these are firms that are
less diversified and have tangible rather than in-
tangible assets. Recent years have seen a growth
in ‘knowledge-intensive businesses’, where assets
are predominantly intangible in nature (knowl-
edge, expertise, relationships). The time period un-
der scrutiny witnesses a ‘rise in the intangible econ-
omy’ (Haskel and Westlake, 2018), and growth in
these knowledge-intensive sectors where firms of-
ten employ what Hal Varian refers to as ‘combina-
torial innovations’ (reported in McKinsey, 2019).
The combinations of products, services and Inter-
net components, where ‘the component parts are
all bits. That means you never run out of them.
You can reproduce them, you can duplicate them,
you can spread them around the world, and you
can have thousands and tens of thousands of in-
novators combining or recombining the same com-
ponent parts to create new innovation at the same
time, in various locations’ (Hal Varian, reported in
McKinsey, 2019). These types of business may at-
tract venture capital investment but, even at later
stages, are less attractive for PE investors and bank
lending due to the complexities of due diligence
and valuation.
PE firms typically possess more financially ori-
ented expertise and may be limited regarding the
expertise required to assess and add value to
firms in sectors with knowledge-based activities
(Wright, Jackson and Frobisher, 2010). Moreover,
informational asymmetry is more acute in the
knowledge-intensive sector (Coff, 1999), and this
relates to the longer development period required
by knowledge-intensive firms in order to reach the
point of generating stable revenues and access-
ing mainstream finance. For knowledge-intensive
firms, revenue generation takes longer after prod-
uct/service development, since customer bases are
more complex, necessitating greater sunk cost in-
vestment and oftentimes repositioning of the busi-
ness in the process of developing sales before cash
flows are generated (Wilson, Wright and Kacer,
2018). The often ‘relationship-specific investment’
in the customer base required to make sales and
retain customers can be very high and long-term
(Dass, Kale and Nanda, 2015).
The valuation of such knowledge-intensive busi-
nesses by PE firms poses major challenges in a
sector with a large number of new entrants and
evolving complex and combinatorial technologies
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(Manigart et al., 2000). Absent clear information
about the acceptability of the product in the mar-
ket or the size of the market, or where assets are
intangible, classic valuation techniques are of lit-
tle use (Manigart et al., 2000). Knowledge-based
businesses generate cash flows from investments in
intangibles rather than from physical assets and
labour. Investment includes R&D, design, brand
equity, software and human/organizational (rela-
tional) capital. This is both difficult to value and
does not provide clear collateral (or liquidation
value) for investors (Wilson, Wright and Kacer,
2018). The challenges are exacerbated in rapidly
changing environments, such as Internet technol-
ogy, apps, etc. that are likely to require significant
injections of equity funding (Wilson, Wright and
Kacer, 2018). The above evidence supports the no-
tion that PE investors have and continue to target
companies outside the knowledge-intensive sector.
The exceptions will be ventures with identifiable
and saleable assets, such as manufacturing tech-
nologies in knowledge-intensive sectors and ser-
vices with well-established customer bases. There-
fore, our last hypothesis is as follows:
H4: Private equity targets are likely to be com-
panies with defined markets and uncompli-
cated service or product lines, and outside of




The data used in this study is derived from an-
nual returns and accounts and document filings
at Companies House. It covers the population
of limited companies in the UK, including all
exits via insolvency or dissolution and all new
entrants. This data source includes financial state-
ments, auditor information, industry sector, com-
pany age, director and shareholder information
that is filed at least annually. The dataset was con-
structed from bulk supply of data from credit
reference agencies (CRAs) (ICC Credit to 2010
and Creditsafe, 2011–2014).1 The CRAs source
their data from Companies House and pre-process
1One of the authors ran a university spin-out company
(2001–2010) involved in corporate risk modelling, in as-
sociation with ICC Credit, and developed the company
panel database via bulk access to the processed Compa-
and check the data fields for the purpose of con-
structing and reporting financial ratios, risk scores
and providing clients with credit reports and/or
due diligence data. Data fields are analysed and
checked against other proprietary data providers
(e.g. FAME, Datastream, Companies House) if a
mistake/anomaly is found in a particular variable.
We investigate PE investments involved in the
acquisition of private companies via buyout mech-
anisms. Although PE investors do now provide
firms with growth finance without taking a ma-
jority stake (acquisition), these cases are very few
and more recent and are not included in the anal-
ysis. In this study, the PE buyout sample covers
the period 1995–2013 and we have looked at the
targeted firm characteristics up to 3 years before
investment, which provides an ‘averaged’ profile
of the characteristics of the PE targets prior to
investment. The data is constructed into a firm-
level panel with company registration number as
the company identifier and accounting data ar-
ranged in date order of submitted accounts up
to and including all filings to the end of March
2015 which, because of the lag in reporting (up
to 10 months after year end) and late filing, cap-
tures all filed accounts with year ends in 2013.
The panel database is unique in its coverage since
CRAs did not historically retain data on dissolved
companies or full company histories, given that
they were geared to providing ‘current’ informa-
tion to clients. The dataset has no issues in relation
to either selection bias or survival bias, unlike other
research datasets or commercially available credit
reference data. Accounting data has limitations;
in particular, small companies are required to file
only abridged accounts inclusive of balance sheet
data (‘modified balance sheets’). Around 40% of
companies file accounts inclusive of profit and loss
(P&L) information. For the purposes of analysis,
nies House filings. ICC operated a ‘disaster recovery ser-
vice’ for Companies House and therefore retained all filed
information. Companies now submit their financial state-
ments, annual returns and other required filings electroni-
cally (since around 2005), but historically this data resided
on paper and microfiche. Hence, CRAs had to extract the
data manually and process it before storing it in databases
and creating added-value services (e.g. credit reports, cal-
culation of performance ratios, credit scores). Individ-
ual CRAs differentiate themselves by the added-value ser-
vices they provide, but process data from the same source.
The authors continue to update the data panel using bulk
feeds from a CRA but no longer have access to CMBOR
data.
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Table 1. Company panel database and estimation sample
Sub-Samples
All Firms (1) Full Accounts (2) Large Firms (3) Full Reporting (4)
Year Population Non PE PE targeted Non PE PE targeted Non PE PE targeted Non PE PE targeted
1995 278656 170006 377 28201 277 17367 258 14583 242
1996 357211 213500 571 39084 450 24794 428 19676 390
1997 478111 279461 786 53411 622 33039 590 25432 530
1998 543707 312482 695 57044 540 34803 515 26211 471
1999 595446 337954 504 62170 399 36589 379 26968 345
2000 628509 363503 383 62772 299 37336 279 27017 248
2001 713233 412282 340 74287 258 42555 246 30311 224
2002 783490 455434 367 85306 282 46135 263 32191 230
2003 850933 491344 397 85320 309 45081 297 30517 248
2004 958484 547697 489 84571 360 42808 336 27870 289
2005 1030105 583795 595 82196 433 42171 402 26358 344
2006 1066865 608852 623 82671 452 42104 421 25508 362
2007 1090087 632023 575 82321 407 41974 378 24536 324
2008 1148565 650318 521 79726 357 41939 328 24354 285
2009 1179173 656276 434 104858 326 55173 302 30859 256
2010 1200326 659588 405 134291 314 67737 291 35205 255
2011 1252436 680079 453 122651 361 65802 339 33614 284
2012 1320083 705831 369 115232 279 65010 259 32807 212
2013 1394439 735058 265 107176 202 63579 184 31639 147
16869859 9495483 9149 1543288 6927 845996 6495 525656 5686
The table describes the number of companies that have submitted accounts in the period 1995-2013, the active company population and
the firm-year observations of known PE target within the population (PE targets). The PE targets are identified within the population
of limited companies that has been screened to only include active companies. Subsamples are based on company size and the extent
of financial reporting.
we reduce the panel to include companies that have
submitted at least one set of accounts with re-
ported assets. This effectively removes non-trading
companies from the analysis sample. Table 1 de-
scribes the data and subsamples used in the anal-
ysis. Table 1, column 1 describes the number of
companies that have submitted accounts in the pe-
riod 1995–2013. From this we select the ‘active’
company sample and the firm-year observations of
known PE-targeted (and invested) firms within the
company population in columns 2 and 3.As shown
in Table 1, the core database has 16.8 million firm-
year observations and 9.5 million ‘active’ compa-
nies. For the purpose of creating a relevant subset
of companies that are relevant to PE investors, the
estimation sample of active companies is formed
by screening the private company population to ex-
clude companies that would be outside the range
of PE known targets and buyouts,2 which could be
deemed investable by PE.
2We exclude firmswith less than £50,000 of real assets and
over £500m and include firms that have filed at least three
sets of financial statements and annual returns and fit the
To the company population database, we match
information, via registration number, on UKman-
agement buyouts and buy-ins (henceforth buyouts)
formed during the sample period, and identify
those that involved PE in the transaction. TheCen-
tre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR)
provided individual company buyout data from
the quarterly survey of UKbuyout activity and PE
investments. This gives 43,780 observations on PE
buyouts, including the pre- and post-buyout peri-
ods. In addition, and for robustness checking, we
create subsamples based on the level of financial
reporting related to company size (Table 1). If we
analyse the data using only abridged account data
fields (sample 1),3 we have a sample of 9.5m com-
pany years, with 9,149 observations of firms that
are acquired by PE investors prior to the acqui-
sition. The average size of firms in this sample is
sector (4-digit SIC codes), age and assets size profile of all
known buyouts during the time period.
3We only use the variables that are available in both sets
of abridged and full accounts (i.e. ‘abridged fields’).
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£3.7m, total assets. Using data of firms that sub-
mit full accounts (sample 2), where we have some
P&L data we have 1.5m company-year observa-
tions with 6,927 PE-targeted firms. The average
size of firms in this sample is £14m, total assets.
In order to calculate measures of productivity, we
select firms that report additional detail, including
number of employees. This subsample (sample 3)
includes over 845,000 company-year observations
and 6,495 PE observations. The larger firms have
a mean asset size of £18m. The final subsample
(sample 4) includes over 500,000 observations of
firms (5,686 PE observations), where we havemore
detailed data on debt and interest payments. The
mean total assets for this sample is £23.5m. We es-
timate models for each of these subsamples. The
data includes records of other management buy-
outs and management buy-ins that have not used
PE finance within the panel during the time period.
The pre-buyout observations are detailed in Ta-
ble 1. These observations are coded as PE-targeted
firms. The goal is to identify the characteristics of
these targeted and invested firms against the popu-
lation of buyouts that do not receive PE investment
and the other private companies selected from the
population but within the parameters of all known
PE deals. Thus, an important feature is that the PE
investors could choose targets from any company
type and sector within the population. Having es-
tablished, in the hypotheses, that the choice of PE
targets is not random, we seek to establish some
distinct characteristics of PE targets within the rel-
evant active company population and subpopula-
tions.
The database includes data on financial perfor-
mance and constructed financial ratios for each
firm over the time period. The accounting data is
processed to provide information on the liquidity,
profitability, leverage, asset composition, growth
and efficiency of firms. The financial structure,
debt/equity can be identified for all firms. Firms
that have obtained some loan finance may have a
‘charge on assets’ (i.e. creditors use fixed or float-
ing asset charges as collateral on the loan; this is
typical when the loan is deemed risky and/or the
firm has intangible assets). We identify all firms
that have a charge on assets as an indicator that
they have been able to raise some debt finance.
NACE codes can be used to identify knowledge-
intensive sectors. The subclassification based on
two-digit NACE codes was performed using the
Eurostat indicators on high-tech industry and
knowledge-intensive services (Table A1 in the on-
line Supporting Information provides details). The
classification used by Eurostat and the Euro-
pean Commission is similar to the older classifi-
cation used by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
Method
In order to test our hypotheses, we profile the
PE target companies compared to the large group
of selected firms and non-PE buyouts during the
whole time period of our data and for subperiods:
1995–2001; 2002–2008; 2009–2013.4 The period
1995–2001 was relatively turbulent, with recovery
from the early 1990s’ recession, and includes the
dot.com boom and its aftermath. The period from
2002, with the exception of a short recession, was
a stable period of low insolvency across all sectors
and was also marked by growth in the buyout mar-
ket culminating in a peak in 2007, before the credit
crisis and recession of 2009 onwards. The period
2009–2013 saw the economy recovering from the
recession resulting from the financial crisis. We are
interested in whether there is a change in the char-
acteristics of the target companies over these peri-
ods and in relation to our hypotheses.
The next stage of the analysis is the estima-
tion of the logit profile of ‘known targets’ (i.e. the
characteristics of the firms that were PE-invested
from the screened population of all private firms).5
For robustness checking, we re-estimate themodel,
including additional P&L variables for the other
three subsamples based on size, financial reporting
and data availability.
4We have split the sample based on the buyout activity
waves defined by Wright et al. (2019). The sample split
in our study is also in line with the business cycle, given
that the flow of funds to small businesses in PE depends
significantly on fluctuations in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment (Berger and Udell, 1998).
5The identification of potential targets in the population
has utility for academic analyses that wish to propensity
score match a sample of firms to use as control in investi-
gations of relative PE performance (treated and treatment
samples) after (post-) investment, but also for practition-
ers that might use such a model to screen the population
of firms in order to identify a large sample of potential
investees that may be subject to further investigation and
due diligence.Given that PE investors are under time pres-
sure to select their portfolios, this could be useful intelli-
gence.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Model specification and variables
In the next step we estimate firm-level models ex-
plaining the probability of obtaining PE funding.
The unit of analysis here is the company-year ob-
servation. The variables are described in more de-
tail below. The approach taken in this study is to
use panel multivariate logistic regression analysis
to model the binary dependent variable (PE tar-
get) in relation to relevant explanatory variables.
The model specification used for the target proba-
bility prediction is as follows:
P(targeti,t = 1 | t ) = 1/{1 + exp[−(β0 + β1Fi,t
+ β2Ni,t + β3Ci,t + ui,t )]}
where F stands for financial variables, N for non-
financial variables, C means control variables and
ui,t is the error term. The financial ratios are de-
fined below and reflect a combination of size, asset
tangibility, liquidity, leverage, performance and ef-
ficiency; non-financial variables are constructed to
measure auditor opinion, asset charges, age, sta-
tus and diversification; and control variables in-
clude industry sector, industry risk and technology.
The aim is to model these characteristics simulta-
neously in amultivariate model in order to identify
a broad profile of PE target companies.6
Dependent variable. Our binary dependent vari-
able is known PE targets versus the population
screened control group (1, 0). We estimate mod-
els using both abridged account fields and, where
available, full accounts.
Independent variables. A range of financial and
non-financial independent variables is used to
model the characteristics of these targets. The data
fields include statutory accounts (abridged or full
accounts) inclusive of financial performance infor-
mation, from which we construct financial ratios;
non-financial information (age, size, industry and
technology classification, auditors, audit qualifica-
tions, changes in auditor and firm location); and
other documents filed (insolvency events, creditor
charges on assets, changes in board or sharehold-
ers). The location of each company is identified by
6The dependent variable is unbalanced in that the target
(1) represents a small proportion of the total company
years. However, the logit estimator produces robust and
unbiased coefficient estimates with disproportionate sam-
pling (Allison, 2015). As Allison notes: ‘… it (logit) is ex-
tremely useful when dealing with very large samples with
rare events. No other link function has this property’.
registered and trading address postcode. The vari-
ables are described in Table 2a along with descrip-
tive statistics, Table 2b (Panels A and B), of the
variables included in multivariate models and tests
for differences in means between subsamples (Co-
hen’s D). The third column of Table 2a explains
why each variable has been added to the model in
respect to each of the hypotheses developed earlier
and the last column shows their expected sign. In
order to test for multicollinearity, we re-estimate
the logit models (Tables 3 and 4) as an equivalent
linear probability model and derive variance infla-
tion factors (VIFs), reported in the final column
of Tables 3 and 4, from which we can conclude
that the multivariate models are not affected by
collinearity issues.
Empirical results
Table 3 reports logistic panel regression estimates
for the full sample of all firms, determining the
probability of PE-backed buyout/firm compared
to the screened sample for the whole time period
and sub-time periods for firms submitting full ac-
counts. The models cannot include variables cap-
turing profitability and productivity. We repeated
the estimation for the other subsample of all com-
panies with additional independent variables of
profitability, productivity and interest coverage, re-
ported in Table 4, Panels A, B andC. In addition to
the logistic regression coefficients, the tables report
odds ratio7 for the whole sample period.
Table 48 shows that PE investors select rela-
tively larger and established buyout targets (Ln As-
sets and Ln Age attract positive signs) with re-
tained profit (Retained/TA) and with some evi-
dence of cash generation (Cash/TA) in the period
since 2002. The earlier period was characterized
7The odds ratio represents the relative odds of the occur-
rence of the outcome of interest (being targeted by PE),
given exposure to the variable of interest. In logistic re-
gression it is the exponential function of the regression
coefficient (eb1). It shows the odds of being targeted given
a one unit increase in the explanatory variable. Alterna-
tively, eb1*StdX1, where StdX1 is the standard deviation of
X1, shows the odds of being targeted given one standard
deviation increase in the explanatory variable.
8We focus on discussing the results in Table 4, as the re-
sults in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent and qualitatively the
same.
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by a significant recession.9 Moreover, Return on
Assets is positive and significant across all mod-
els in Panels B and C, supporting H1 that PE tar-
gets have a record of profit. However, the sign of
net worth (Equity/TA) variable is consistently neg-
ative and significant across all specifications and
subsamples, giving support for the underperfor-
mance stated in H1. Furthermore, interest cov-
erage (Operating Profit/Interest payments) is sig-
nificant and positive (Table 4, Panel C)10 (i.e. PE
targets have better interest coverage ratios, sup-
porting H1). Thus, PE investors target companies
that are likely to be better able to service debt
from cash and profit. PE targets are more likely
to have a Charge on Assets, indicative of borrow-
ing activity, and therefore may benefit from refi-
nancing. This is consistent across all time periods
and subsamples.11 Overall, there is support for H1
in that the firms clearly have profit potential and
are cash-generative with lower net worth, making
firms more likely targets for PE investment.
The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that PE
targets firms with tangible assets and lower fail-
ure risk. A number of variables in the multivariate
models support this notion. For the subsamples of
larger companies, the sign on debt levels (Debt/TA)
is consistently negative and significant, suggesting
that PE targets firms with lower levels of debt and
therefore lower failure risk. Variables that control
for industry competition (Herfindhal–Hirschman
Indices) and industry risk (Industry Weight of Ev-
idence, or log odds of failure in the sector, where
negative values indicate higher risk sectors) at-
tract the expected signs, suggesting that PE tar-
gets are more likely in lower-risk sectors (but the
competition index is not often significant). More-
over, the variable for Audit Qualification is always
negative and significant, indicating clean accounts
and lower risk of financial distress for the targeted
9The results also suggest that firms located in urban areas
are more likely to be targeted in the period before 2002.
10Interest coverage can only be calculated reliably for
larger companies.
11We can also look at the odds ratios. For example, look-
ing at the odds ratio for retained profit (Retained/TA),
we can see that the odds of becoming a target increases
by 30% (1 − odds ratio) for each unit increase in this
variable. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in re-
tained profit (0.242) increases the odds of becoming a tar-
get by 6% (1 − exp(0.262*0.242)), where 0.262 and 0.242
are the estimation coefficient and the standard deviation
of the Retained/TA variable, respectively.
firms across the time periods.12 Finally, the sign on
Intangibility in our analysis of the set of compa-
nies providing full accounts is negative and signifi-
cant as we move to the subsamples of larger com-
panies, indicating that PE investors avoid targets
with higher levels of intangible assets, which gives
further support for H2. As inventory is a tangible
asset and can be used as collateral, a positive sign
may suggest that target firms have a strong base of
tangible assets. The variable Inventory/TA (which
is the ratio of inventory to total assets) is positive
and significant for the larger firms (Table 4) but not
for all subperiods. Overall, there is much support
for H2 that PE targets firms in stable sectors with
low failure risk and high level of asset tangibility.
The targeted firms are profitable with cash gen-
eration but in low-risk and less competitive sec-
tors. Consequently, it is possible that these firms
have not had the incentive to seek out the most
efficient and innovative practices, thus giving the
PE the opportunity to change managerial incen-
tives and invest in products and processes to both
stimulate growth and value added via efficiency im-
provements. Regarding H3, the models inclusive
of variables reflecting Productivity provide consis-
tent results. We estimate models inclusive of pro-
ductivity variables in Panels B and C of Table 4.
Our measure of productivity is value added per
employee. Value added is trading profit plus wages
and salaries. Consistent with H3, the sign on the
productivity variable is small but negative, sug-
gesting that targets have lower productivity and
consequently have scope for generating efficiencies
through capital investment and restructuring go-
ing forward.
With respect to H4, the diversification vari-
able (Diversified) is negative, suggesting that PE
investors focus on single-product/service targets,
but the variable is often insignificant so there is
only very weak support for H4 that PE tends to
target companies with defined markets and un-
complicated product lines. The variables reflect-
ing high and low-technology manufacturing (High
Tech Manuf, Medium High Manuf, Medium Low
Manuf, Low Tech Manuf) have positive signs in all
periods, suggesting that PE investors chose com-
panies across all manufacturing but with a higher
probability in medium to low technology. The
12Table 3 also shows that firms with audited accounts are
more likely to be targeted by PE investors.
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signs on the variables on knowledge-intensive sec-
tors (K-I Market Services, K-I Financial Services,
Other K-I Services, Less K-I Market Services) are
generally negative or insignificant throughout the
period, providing support for H4 that PE investors
have and continue to target companies outside
of the knowledge-intensive sector. Although there
is some evidence that PE investors choose to in-
vest in the high-technology end of the knowledge-
intensive sector (High Tech Services) and the co-
efficient on this variable is positive and significant
and stronger in recent time periods. This may re-
flect opportunities in the evolving financial services
and credit (debt) management sector during this
time period.
Conclusions
Our results contribute to the literature on PE
portfolio firm investment and target selection, an
area where there is scant theoretical development
and empirical evidence. In this study, we have at-
tempted to understand the nature of and possi-
ble reasons behind the selection of targets by PE
investors. The hypotheses draw on agency theory
and specifically the observation that a PE firm’s se-
lection criteria will be driven by its role as an agent
for LP investors; their relationship with banks as
providers of debt finance and the time pressures
to identify, select and add value to portfolio firms,
providing returns to investors. As an active in-
vestor, the PE investor acts as principal in man-
aging the relationship with the investee and seeks
targets where it is clear that growth can be achieved
via changes in incentives, governance and opera-
tional and capital investments.
The profiling of PE-targeted firms, using a mul-
tivariate technique that assesses all firm-level char-
acteristics simultaneously, generates a range of
significant characteristics. There is much support
for our hypotheses. PE acquires established com-
panies in terms of age and size that are more
likely to have a higher proportion of tangible as-
sets. These firms are in stable industry sectors
with lower-than-average failure rate and are less
likely to be diversified (single product). Amongst
the riskier sectors, PE investors have a preference
for advanced manufacturing technologies and the
high-technology end of the services sector. The
firms that PE investors target are generally cash-
generative, profitable and have high interest cov-
erage ratios on existing debt. The firms are likely
to have borrowed and have charges on assets.
The acquisitions are in a good position to ser-
vice debt after acquisition. These firms have lower
levels of equity and lower-than-average produc-
tivity, thus providing opportunities for investors
to realize performance improvement, and growth,
post-investment. PE investors focus on single-
product/service firms and/or tangible investments
with high levels of collateral. This supports the
hypothesis that PE tends to invest in companies
with defined markets and uncomplicated product
lines. The results support the notion that PE in-
vestors have and continue to invest in companies
outside the knowledge-intensive sector and choose
targets that are more established, cash-generative
and profitable, but can benefit from restructuring
and further capital investment.
Our study has limitations and indicates avenues
for extending future research. Data limitations
have prevented an analysis of the similarities and
synergies between the portfolio firms of individual
PE funds, and this would be a useful addition to
our understanding of PE firms’ target selection.
Similarly, it would be useful to explore the geo-
graphical distance between investor and investee.
Research on the provision of growth finance has
shown that the geographical distance between the
investor’s location and the portfolio company has
an influence on the equity finance investment pat-
terns, known as ‘local bias’ (Sorenson and Stuart,
2001; Wilson, Wright and Kacer, 2019). The PE
firm typically establishes networks within an in-
dustry or a geographic area and follows recom-
mendations from close contacts in order to estab-
lish an advantage in finding and evaluating quality
investment opportunities. Network advantages are
likely to decline as geographic distance increases.
Consequently, these networks will affect the loca-
tion bias of PE investment activities. This is worthy
of further investigation (i.e. if or how networks af-
fect the location bias of PE investment activities).
Moreover, further analysis could investigate more
detail of the director and management character-
istics of target companies. Clearly there is much
scope for further work in relation to the analysis
of sources and characteristics of targeted firms.
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